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from a legal point of view. A great deal of excellent work has been done in projects
implementing the work programs of these conventions. The Global Environment Facility
(GEF) alone has facilitated the commitment of some $6 billion to biodiversity conservation
projects, including some $2 billion of its own resources. In 2005 the Third Overall Perform-
ance Study of the GEF concluded that it has reduced the loss of biodiversity. The International
Union for the Conservation of Nature has also concluded that the GEF has supported protected
area investments that constitute almost 17 percent of the total land area protected globally.
But, remember, we are talking about the role of law and legal solutions.
Unlike ozone depletion and, to a lesser extent, climate change, the causes of biodiversity
loss are multi-faceted. The majority of them relate to activities that take place in areas under
national jurisdiction and are often closely linked to other issues such as climate change and
burgeoning human demands on natural resources, water, and habitat. Both conventions have
commanded high rates of accession and the constituent legal instruments have played an
important organizational or managerial role in setting out the key aspects of the important
agenda. However, we do not yet have the beginnings of the equivalent of a Kyoto Protocol.
We are still waiting for detailed Protocols with national commitment targets on the most
pressing areas of biodiversity conservation, including protected areas, forests, and marine
resources. And, there are other examples.
Looking towards 2050, there is a great deal that must be done relatively quickly-within
the next 10-20 years. The developing world is demanding energy. Over 1.6 billion people
lack access to electricity, and 2.4 billion still rely on biomass for cooking and heating-the
collection of which is often itself a threat to habitats and biodiversity and the burning of
which is unhealthy. In Africa only 20% of the population is connected to an electricity grid,
and supplies are often unreliable and erratic. More than $200 billion of investments in energy
infrastructure are made annually and this infrastructure will last for 30-40 years. Hamilton
and Johnson suggest that the equivalent of 1,000 large electric power plants will need to be
built each year to meet demand through 2050. The challenge is to ensure that these huge
investments are environmentally friendly and, in particular, low carbon. This will require
technology innovation and financing, from the public as well as the private sector, and often
in partnership because the private sector cannot be expected to deliver global public goods
by itself. It will also require a partnership between the North and the South. The 2002
Monterrey Summit on Finance for Development represented an important start but, as the
Stern Review indicates, the scale of action needed is far higher than the Monterrey targets
of 0.2 % of GDP in rich countries. The issue is essentially not about aid but mutual self-
preservation.
International law has the potential to play a major role in this agenda, but experience
shows how important it is that the major developed countries-including the United States-
act together in addressing these issues.
JUDGING TREATIES
By Lakshman Guruswamy*
We were requested by our chair, Professor Setear, to offer two examples of international
environmental treaties: a success and a failure. My illustration of a failed treaty is the Kyoto
Protocol which has generally been acclaimed as a success. Indeed one of my co-panelists
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
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cites Kyoto as his example of a successful treaty. It behooves me, therefore, to make the case
against Kyoto somewhat more completely than might otherwise be the case, and constrains me
to deal only with the Kyoto Protocol.
PREDICATES
Since success and failure may be predicated on differing and perhaps contradictory criteria,
it may be useful to delineate the core indicia on which my selection has been based. The
first relates to the correct identification and diagnosis of the problem or issue that an
international environmental treaty purports to address. Over the last fifty years, international
law has become a dynamic instrumentalist social force addressing a wide range of socioeco-
nomic, sociopolitical, and biophysical challenges through bilateral, regional, and global
treaties. Many treaties are functional, instrumentalist social forces, and contemporary interna-
tional law now includes a formidable corpus of treaties dealing, for example, with labor,
human rights, health, intellectual property, taxation, the environment, and energy. These
treaties establish articulated and implied goals and objectives, and some of them create new
institutions. The first criterion used in my selection will be the degree to which the full
extent of the problem, in all its complexity, is accurately identified. When dealing with a
complex challenge, the diagnostic dimension of a treaty should recognize and not gloss over
the panoply of difficulties presented by it. This is an essential starting point for confronting
and addressing those problems.
Second, following upon the correct diagnosis, treaties should embody prescriptions aimed
at the core of the problem, and deal with the sources of the malady. They should not skirt
around the challenge or be directed to symptoms rather than the cause. Prescriptive remedies
should accurately target the sources and the substantial remedies they prescribe should include
methods of implementation and compliance. Where behavioral changes are necessary, the
treaty should be directed toward eliciting behavioral changes among offending states. In
order to secure behavioral change functional, goal-oriented treaties should be able to command
and induce compliance through compliance securing architecture, and methods that both
effectively and beneficially impact the problems addressed by them.
1
Third, the remedies and methods employed by a treaty should have a demonstrably benefi-
cial impact on the problem and help move the treaty toward the practical attainment of its
goals and objectives. In the environmental and energy arena, even the hitherto limited
inquires about compliance with international treaties addressing complex problems have been
theoretical. They have been confined to two questions. First, has international law been
implemented? Meaning, has it been incorporated into domestic law through legislative,
judicial, or executive action. This will hereinafter be referred to as formal implementation.
Second, to what extent have countries complied with a treaty? Meaning, have they adhered
to its provisions, and deployed the formal implementing machinery established by it.2 This
will be referred to as formal compliance.
The real success of a treaty, however, depends on more that the formal acceptance of legal
obligations; it lies in its effective implementation (hereinafter effectiveness).3 Effectiveness
refers both to the extent and manner in which a treaty has achieved its goals. A treaty which
1 See Jose E. Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 303, 305 (1998).
2 See DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE (2000); EDITH BROWN WEISS & HAROLD JACOBSON,
ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS (1998).
3 See M. A. Fitzmaurice & C. Redgwell, Environmental Non-Compliance Procedures and International Law, 31
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 35 (2000).
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aims low and achieves little could nonetheless be effectively implemented. As a whole a
treaty containing demanding prescriptive remedies may be adjudged more favorably than
one that does not, but effectiveness for the purposes of this essay is a more limited concept.
The effectiveness of a treaty, therefore, is not based on the depth of its commitments or the
extent to which it addresses the problem that called for legal remediation. For example, some
unfavorably judged treaties may contain shallow commitments or inadequate goals, or fail
to address tough issues.4 They do not have a significant impact on the problem or do not
result in behavioral changes. It is possible that such treaties reiterate what states would have
done anyway, or require only minimal changes that do not significantly affect the underlying
problem. Nonetheless, once they are negotiated, agreed to and come into force, they become
part of the corpus of international law even if they flunk the test of good prescription. They
could be implemented effectively despite their very limited or modest goals.
This brings up the impact of a treaty on the underlying issue.5 This is perhaps the most
important criteria for determining the success or failure of a treaty. By impact, I mean the
extent to which a treaty has solved or made significant steps toward solving the problem it
confronted. The extent of its beneficial impact will depend on the degree to which a treaty
institutionalizes tough and serious objectives, as distinct from shallow, inadequate, or inconse-
quential objectives. Furthermore, it should embody compliance-eliciting methods and measures
that are directed toward changing state behavior. Consequently, the impact of a treaty will
depend on the nature of its goals or objectives, its methods, and the extent to which it succeeds
in changing state behavior. It is important, therefore, to understand a treaty not only in terms
of its effectiveness in achieving stated goals, but also in terms of its impact as a satisfactory
response to the challenge addressed and the degree to which it changes state behavior.
When dealing with effectiveness and impacts it is important to identify the goals of a treaty
and to compare such goals with the results produced. It is also necessary to inquire about
the depth of these goals and the extent to which they did or did not remedy the problem
being addressed. Where the results, garnered from empirical data and evidence, do not match
goals, or point to the inadequacy of those goals, questions may arise as to the reasons for
such shortfalls. For as noted above, it is possible for shallow commitments and modest goals
to reflect what countries are already doing rather than what is needed to address the problem
at hand. Such an inquiry must traverse institutions, compliance methods, enforcement, as
well as the socioeconomic, political, or cultural context that might explain the gaps between
the goals of a treaty and the inability to meet them, or the meagerness of the goals and the
ease with which they were met.
There is a substantial body of literature on "effectiveness." 6 However, these otherwise
theoretically illuminating contributions do not include any authoritative conclusions based
on comprehensive empirical examination of compliance, effectiveness, or impact of energy
4 See George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L
ORG. 379, 383 (1996).
5 Kal Raustiala, Compliance & Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L
L. 387, 393-94 (2000). Although Raustiala conflates the two concepts, this article draws a distinction between
effectiveness and impact. It is possible that while a treaty might have a negligible impact on the underlying problem,
it is nonetheless part of a broader response to the problem that, when considered in its entirety, exerts a far more
meaningful impact. To the extent this is the case, the treaty should, in the evaluative rubric set forth here, be self-
identified as part of this larger and ostensibly coordinated response.
6 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYEs, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTrrTIONS (1995); Downs et al., supra note 4; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997); Oran R. Young et al., Regime Effectiveness: Taking
Stock, in THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 249 (Oran R. Young ed., 1999).
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and environmental agreements. 7 The impressive study by Weiss and Jacobson was based on
five treaties.8 This is primarily because of the absence of comprehensive and organized
empirical evidence or data.
In judging the success or failure of a treaty, the importance of empirical evidence backing
any such claims cannot be overemphasized. The absence of such data renders any judgment
more impressionistic than objective.
FLAWED DIAGNOSIS OFFERED BY THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
Mistaking Symptoms for Cause
Kyoto offers the wrong diagnosis. First, its exclusive focus on greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions produced by the burning of fossil fuels treats the symptoms not the cause. Because
greenhouse gas emissions (of primary relevance here is carbon dioxide) result from burning
fossil fuels (or hydrocarbons) such as oil, gas, and coal, Kyoto should have aimed at institution-
alizing laws and policies for obtaining and securing renewable and sustainable energy to
replace global warming causing hydrocarbons. Instead, all Kyoto did was to control emissions
of GHGs.
The fact that 85% of the burgeoning energy needs of the world are now, and will continue
through the next thirty years to be based on hydrocarbons, means that carbon dioxide
emissions will continue to increase unless two strategies addressing the supply and demand
side are in place. 9 On the supply side, alternative fuels must be found, while the demand
side should establish energy conservation and efficiency. Kyoto almost totally ignored these
two courses of action.
Kyoto did make a passing reference to energy efficiency.10 These provisions were almost
hermetically sealed from the rest of the treaty and, unlike the controls on GHGs, implementa-
tion of these provisions was left to the conference of the parties who were only empowered
so that they "may take" action to implement the efficiency and sustainable energy provisions
of Kyoto. The cursory treatment of alternative fuels and technologies is to be contrasted to
the elaborate machinery constructed to track carbon dioxide. That machinery consists of an




Second, the Kyoto Protocol failed to diagnose and address a number of intrinsically
interconnected issues. We live in a civilization built on oil, and we are dependent upon oil
for our most important life support systems from transport, food and agriculture, health
and medicine, technology, to military security. According to one estimate, world energy
7 THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE, at ix (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998).
8 See WEISS & JACOBSON, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9 EIA, International Energy Outlook 2006, Highlights 1-2 (2006), available at <http://www.eia.doe.gv/oiaflieol
index.html>.
10 Kyoto Protocol, Art. 2(l)(a)(I). This included references to research, development, and increased use of
new and renewable forms of energy, carbon dioxide sequestration technologies, and advanced and innovative
environmentally sound technologies. Art. 2(l)(a)(iv).
" Id., Arts. 4-11.
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consumption is predicted to increase 71% from 2003 to 2030. During this period, world oil
use grows from 80 million barrels per day in 2003 to 98 million barrels per day.
12
Our civilization, which is built on a finite resource-oil, is facing the peaking, diminishing,
and eventual scarcity of that natural resource. The "peaking of oil" refers to the fact that
new discoveries of oil hitherto have enabled oil supply to stay ahead of demand. However,
the increasing demand for conventional oil will reach a point where oil supply will no longer
be able to meet demand. At this point, world oil supply will peak and begin to decline.
Unfortunately this is the time when world demand for oil will be increasing at a massive
rate. The compelling need for substitute sources of energy to replace oil offers strong reasons,
independent of global warming, for focusing on energy rather than carbon dioxide.
In 2000, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) after the most exhaustive study of existing
petroleum reserves, projected future discoveries, extractions from presently abandoned wells,
and conventional and unconventional oil resources, estimated there were approximately three
trillion barrels of oil in the world. Using this data, the U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA) advanced the mean or expected scenario and estimated that oil would peak in 2037.13
Despite criticisms from both oil pessimists1 4 and optimists, 15 this paper adopts the authorita-
tive, unbiased, and comprehensive assessment prepared by the USGS and EIA as the best
assessment of peaking oil.
If oil peaks around 2037, it will cripple transportation and crush globalization and trade.
Risk management requires that we take remedial action at least twenty years before that
happens. 16
Excluding Developing Countries
The third major misdiagnosis of the Kyoto Protocol was to assume that the answers to
global warming via carbon dioxide reductions could be found without the active participation
of developing countries. The need for developing countries to be involved in the partnership
to find alternative sources of energy becomes self-evident in face of the fact that developing
(non OECD) countries will be consuming more energy than the OECD countries by 2015.17
Since developing country reliance on oil will still be around 33% of their total energy use,18 the
stake of developing countries in finding energy solutions, and the duty of developed countries
to help do so under common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) is self evident.
Instead, Kyoto directed developed (annex 1) countries to cut down their GHG emissions
by 5% to 7% below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012, but developing (non annex 1)
countries were not bound by these legal restrictions. In so doing, Kyoto appears to be
throwing a bone to developing countries, but it is actually excluding developing countries
12 EIA, supra note 9, at 2.
13 EIA, Long Term World Oil Supply, available at <http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil-gas/petroleum/presentations/
2000/long-term-supply/sIdOOl.hn>. EIA used these findings to develop 12 scenarios for peak oil. They were
based on the three USGS predictions of oil reserves (high, expected, and low), and four growth rates (0%, 1%,
2%, and 3%).
14 ROBERT L. HIRSCH ET AL., PEAKING OF WORLD OIL PRODUCTION: IMPACT, MITIGATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT
69 (2005).
15 Cambridge Energy Research Associate, Press Release, Peak Oil Theory-"World Running Out of Oil Soon"--
Is Faulty; Could Distort Policy & Energy Debate (2006).
16 HIRSCH ET AL., supra note 14, at 69.
17 7 EIA, supra note 13, at 1-2.
18 Id.
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from becoming stakeholders. More strikingly, it has absolved developed countries of their
responsibilities under the principle of CBDR.
This non-inclusion of developing countries as partners, and the exemption of developed
countries from their duty to search for solutions to the problems of energy and global
warming, is a violation of Art. 3(1) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC).1 9 Art 3(1) of UNFCCC states: "The Parties should protect the climate
for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and
in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change
and the adverse effects thereof." Both in its preamble and its substantive principles, the
UNFCCC explicitly incorporates the right to sustainable development, and by clear inference
and implication, also recognizes the importance of renewable or sustainable energy and new
technologies that promote such sources of energy. 20 Moreover, UNFCCC affirms that a right
to development must entail the greater use of energy among developing countries, and that
the ill effects of increased energy use should be offset by energy efficiency as well as new
technologies creating sustainable and renewable energy.2 1 Furthermore, it calls for measures
that address the causes of climate change 22 and for the transfer of technologies, including those
dealing with renewable and sustainable energy that prevent emissions of greenhouse gases.
23
Focusing Only on Global Warming and Diminishing Sustainable Development
By focusing only on global warming, Kyoto has thwarted sustainable development among
developing countries. It did so by ignoring the need to deal with poverty as a necessary step
toward the creation of new sources of sustainable energy. While the energy needs of the
developing world will overtake those of the developed world by 2015, large parts of the
developing world are desperately poor. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of the
United Nations identified ten areas that should be addressed before 2015. They included the
goals of halving the proportion of the people living on less than one dollar a day, providing
primary education, eliminating gender disparity, reducing the mortality rate, improving mater-
nal health, combating AIDS, malaria and other diseases, and reducing by half the number
of people without access to safe drinking water. Unlike global warming, these are problems
that are killing hundreds even thousands of men, women, and children daily and demand urgent
action. CBDR requires developed countries to promote sustainable development (SD) and to
weave renewable and sustainable energy into the fabric of SD.
In any rank ordering or risk assessment of the perils posed by poverty as against global
warming, it is abundantly clear that poverty is the more important and urgent. Almost 4
million dying from malnutrition (underweight), 3 million from HIV/AIDS, 2.5 million from
indoor and outdoor air pollution, more than 2 million from lack of micronutrients (iron, zinc
and vitamin A) and almost 2 million from lack of clean drinking water. The Kyoto Protocol
would likely cost at least $180 billion a year but would do little to reduce global warming.
UNICEF estimates that just $70-80 billion a year could give all Third World inhabitants
access to the basics like health, education, water, and sanitation. 24 Investing these resources
19 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 UNTS 165.
20 Art. 3(4).
21 Art. 4(c).
22 Arts. 3(3), 4(1)(b).
23 3 Art. 4(1)(c).
24 UNICEF, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN (2000), available at <http://www.unicef.org/sowc00/>.
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in developing countries so that some of their basic problems are solved would be an application
of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. Rid of these crippling problems,
they could be in a position, with more help from developing countries, to cooperate in finding
solutions to the energy challenge.
INADEQUATE IMPACT OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
The results and impacts of Kyoto have been poor. Carbon dioxide emissions continue to
increase almost inexorably. Already three countries-China, the United States, and India-
are planning to build nearly 850 new coal-fired plants, which would pump up to five times
as much carbon dioxide into the atmosphere as the Kyoto Protocol aims to reduce.25 Overall,
developed countries have not reduced their emissions to anywhere near 5% below 1990
levels as required by Kyoto. Even in the European Union, greenhouse gas emissions rose
not fell according to available statistics.26 But assuming Kyoto is fully implemented, computer
models based on Kyoto's mandated emission levels, appear, under one viewpoint, to forecast
an avoidance of one-twentieth of one degree of the predicted global warming by the end of
the century.27 Another view is that the Kyoto Protocol helps only to the extent of a 16%
reduction of global warming if that reduction is held stable for the whole of the century.
28
But, of course, that is not the case.
A more recent authoritative study concluded that the impact on projected temperature
increases, with all countries doing only what is required under Kyoto and then continuing
with business as usual, would be a scant 0.06 to 0.11 0C (0.11 to 0.20'F) shaved off total
warming, which is roughly a 3% reduction. 29 The scientific premise and conclusions underly-
ing Kyoto demand far greater carbon dioxide reductions. To abate or avoid catastrophic
global warming, advocates for reducing GHGs have argued for reductions in the range of
60-70% below 1990 GHG levels, not the 4-5% called for.
CONCLUSIONS
The reason for the Cinderella treatment meted out by Kyoto to strategies advancing
efficiency, conservation, and sustainable energy can only be explained on the basis of a
genuine but misconceived fixation on GHG emission reductions by the negotiating parties.
The inability of these law-makers to correctly diagnose and prescribe adequate remedies for a
monumental global problem may perhaps be attributed to the deafening cacophony demanding
GHG reductions-and nothing else-from well meaning albeit misdirected legions of environ-
mentalists, the media, and politicians who managed to lose sight of the crucial fact that GHG
reductions in the face of increasing energy demand of this magnitude cannot occur unless
there are alternative sources of energy.
25 Mark Clayton, New Coal Plants Bury "Kyoto," CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec 23, 2004, at 1.
26 Richard Ingham, EU Way Off Course For Meeting Kyoto Targets Say Latest Figures, June 22, 2006, available
at <http://www.terradaily>.
27 Russell Jones, An Assessment of the Kyoto Protocol, 11 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 767, 777 (1999).
28 Henry D. Jacoby et al., Kyoto's Unfinished Business, 77 FOREIGN AFl. 63, 64 (July/Aug. 1998).
29 Tom Wigley, The Kyoto Protocol: C02, CH4 and Climate Implications, 25 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 2285
(1998). If, on the other hand, after the Protocol expires, the Annex B countries continued to abide by Kyoto's
limits but did not make any new commitments further to cut emissions for the rest of the century, the results were
not dramatically different. This "constant compliance" scenario would shave 0.11 to 0.21 degrees Celsius (0.20
to 0.38°F) off global average temperatures by 2100. Stated another way, instead of heating up by 2.5°C (4.5°F),
a midpoint in the range of projections of global warming, Earth would warm approximately 6% less.

